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firms, while the presence of firms in the same sector deters firm entry due to 
competition. However, the interaction effect between taxes and agglomeration rents 
on firm entry is significant. We show that a higher effective tax rate in a district 
weakens the positive impact of the agglomeration rents on location decisions of 
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1. Introduction 
 
Location decisions of firms have been studied extensively – both theoretically and 
empirically – especially since the development of the New Economic Geography 
(NEG) theory at the beginning of the nineties. Different models developed in this 
NEG literature (a.o. Krugman, 1991; Venables, 1996) state that there are forces 
pulling firms towards a centre of economic activity and forces pushing them away.  
The forces pulling firms towards the centre are what we call agglomeration forces. 
According to the Krugman-model, the main agglomeration force is market access. 
The closer one is to the centre of economic activity, the better the access to a 
market in order to sell the firm’s goods. The intuition is that firms want to locate 
close to their workers - as workers constitute firms' consumers and therefore the 
market - and workers want to locate close to firms - as they will get a higher (real) 
wage in the firms' vicinity. According to the Venables-model, the main 
agglomeration force is not the closeness to consumers but rather the closeness to 
other firms that supply or demand intermediate goods. In case a firm is a final 
producer, it prefers to be close to its intermediate suppliers.  If a firm is an 
intermediate supplier, on the other hand, it prefers to be close to final producers. 
One force pulling firms away from the centre is the competition effect. Indeed, the 
closer firms are to each other in a certain region, the more they will suffer from 
severe competition and the less attractive that region will be. Crucial is therefore 
whether the competition effect (pushing firms away) outweighs the agglomeration 
effect (attracting firms) or rather the other way around1 (De Bruyne, 2006). 
Next to the determinants of location decisions of firms discussed in the NEG 
theories, there are many other location determinants. Government policy, for 
instance, also plays a large role. One such instrument of government policy is the 
corporate tax rate. De Mooij and Ederveen (2003) show that a decrease of 1 
percentage point in the corporate tax rate leads to an increase in foreign direct 
investment (FDI) by 3.3%. Within Belgium, different effective tax rates across 
regions or districts are possible. Vandenbussche et al. (2006) provide empirical 
evidence that the effective tax rate of firms located in Belgium is significantly 
different across regions after taking into account firm and sector characteristics.  
The aim of this paper is to determine the individual impact and the interaction of 
both corporate taxes ánd agglomeration rents on location decisions of firms in 
Belgium. Especially the interaction between these factors is recently a new research 
area. We would like to contribute to the limited number of empirical studies by 
                                       
1 According to the New Economic Geography (NEG) literature, this will depend on the level of 
transportation costs. 
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taking into account two different measures of agglomeration rents: a supply- and a 
demand-induced agglomeration rent. We count the number of new firms in two 
periods, one before the Belgian tax reform, 1999-2001, and one after the Belgian 
tax reform, 2004-2006. Using a Poisson estimation model, the results indicate that 
both types of agglomeration rents play an important role for location decisions in 
Belgium before the tax reform. Nevertheless, the role of supply-induced 
agglomeration rents alters depending on which level of aggregation agglomeration 
rents are measured. It seems that the presence of other firms in a district attracts 
firms, while they do not or even deter firm entry when we measure the presence of 
other firms at the sector-level. Moreover, we come to the conclusion that there is 
always an interaction effect playing between taxes and agglomeration rents. This 
means that regions with high tax rates can compensate for this with agglomeration 
rents, while regions with positive agglomeration rents must be careful not to 
eliminate this effect by setting too high tax rates. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. We start with a literature overview in 
Section 2, focusing on both taxation and location literature on the one hand and the 
Belgian tax system on the other hand. Section 3 deals with the data sources and the 
descriptive statistics while section 4 tackles the methodology. Section 5 reports the 
empirical results and section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature overview 
2.1 Tax competition and agglomeration rents 
In the taxation literature, several empirical studies have shown that corporate taxes 
have a negative impact on attracting FDI. According to a meta-study of De Mooij 
and Ederveen (2003), a decrease in the corporate tax rate with 1% point leads to 
an increase in FDI by 3.3%. Also, the impact of taxes on entrepreneurship - the 
formation of new businesses - has been studied before, although less than FDI. 
These studies find that a 10% point decrease in the tax rate increases the entry 
rate in a country by 0.88 to 1.3% points (Da Rin et al., 2008; Djankov et al., 2008). 
This negative correlation between taxes and FDI leads to countries lowering their 
corporate taxes in order to attract firms (Wilson, 1999). However, a clear race-to-
the-bottom in corporate taxes in Europe has not been found in empirical research 
(Devereux e.a., 2002; Vandenbussche and Crabbé, 2005) 
A possible reason why a fast race-to-the-bottom in tax rates has not observed is 
provided by the NEG literature. This strand of literature argues that increasing 
returns to scale and imperfect competition combined with transport costs may cause 
agglomeration. If firms locate in a few regions, this agglomeration generates 
benefits such as spillovers and the presence of suppliers and buyers of intermediate 
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goods, market access and so on (De Bruyne (2006)). The importance of market 
access for a firm's location decision was first put forward by Krugman (1991). 
Crucial in his model are the firm-consumer linkages. Venables (1996) argued that 
not market access, but rather the presence of other firms is important to a location 
decision. The idea is that intermediate suppliers want to be close to the firms that 
buy their goods and vice versa. Therefore, his model emphasizes the firm-firm 
linkages. 
Summarizing, the literature states that corporate taxes deter firms and that 
agglomeration rents - caused by either market access or the presence of other firms 
- attract firms. Combining both insights, one might conclude that more 
agglomerated regions will be able to tax agglomeration rents without driving firms 
away. Several authors provide theoretical support for the existence of taxable 
agglomeration rents. Ludema and Wooton (2000) show indeed that as trade costs 
decrease, integration will attenuate tax competition. Andersson and Forslid (1999) 
show that mobile factors will not move if tax rates change only marginally, thus 
again indicating the existence of agglomeration rents. Kind, Midelfart-Knarvik and 
Schjelderup (2000) also show that tax competition depends on trade costs and 
pecuniary externalities. Baldwin and Krugman (2004) and Borck and Pflüger (2006), 
finally, developed a core-periphery model with taxation. The first paper is based on 
the core-periphery network, while the second one uses a model yielding partial 
stable agglomeration in addition to the core-periphery outcome. Both papers show 
that the tax differential between alternative locations is explained by the difference 
in their agglomeration patterns. The tax differential turns out to be a bell-shaped 
function of trade integration since agglomeration rents are a bell-shaped function of 
trade costs. Indeed, for respectively high and low trade costs one finds fairly low 
agglomeration rents. For intermediate trade costs, agglomeration rents turn out to 
be highest. Therefore, it is expected that the tax differential between the core of 
economic activity and the periphery is highest for intermediate trade costs. In other 
words, for these intermediate trade costs agglomeration rents in the centre are 
higher, implying that taxes can be set at a higher level in the centre compared to 
the periphery. Charlot and Paty (2007) confirm this theory empirically for France 
and Coulibaly (2008) for Switzerland. They estimate a derived tax-setting equation 
for the municipalities of respectively France and Switzerland. The authors confirm a 
positive and significant relationship between the tax rate and market access, which 
suggests there is a taxable agglomeration rent in French and Swiss municipalities. 
The central question in this paper is whether agglomeration rents, taxes and their 
interaction have an impact on the location decisions of firms in Belgium. From the 
basic tax competition models, we know that higher corporate taxes as such act as a 
push factor for firms. In contrast, the NEG states that agglomerated regions have 
agglomeration rents that may act as a pull factor for firms - pulling firms to the 
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centre of economic activity. Finally, theory indicates that taxes and agglomeration 
rents may mitigate each other. 
Several empirical studies have tackled the impact of tax levels ánd agglomeration 
rents on the location decision of firms. Devereux, Griffith and Simpson (2007) also 
studied the impact of agglomeration economies on the sensitivity to local fiscal 
incentives of firms' location choices in the UK. More specifically, the authors dig into 
the effect of grants on location decisions of firms. They find that grants have a small 
effect in attracting plants to specific geographic areas, but that firms are less 
responsive to subsidies in areas where there are fewer existing plants in their 
industry - again confirming the importance of agglomeration rents. Solé-Ollé and 
Jofre-Monseny (2007) show for Catalonia that taxes have a negative impact on 
location. They observe that omitting agglomeration variables leads to a severe 
underestimation of the negative effect of business taxes on location decisions. But 
the first paper to study the interaction effect of agglomeration rents and taxation on 
location decisions of firms is however by Brülhart, Jametti and Schmidheiny (2009). 
They find empirical evidence that firm births in Swiss municipalities on average 
react negatively to corporate tax burdens, but that the deterring effect of taxes is 
significantly weaker in sectors that are more spatially concentrated.  
A study by Konings and Torfs (2010) finds that agglomeration economies exist even 
in a small country like Belgium. They have three very detailed agglomeration 
measures (knowledge spillovers, input linkages and access to workers) and show 
that these agglomeration rents have a significant positive impact on the productivity 
of Belgian firms. 
Our study contributes to this literature by analyzing the interaction of agglomeration 
rents and taxes for new Belgian firms and thus providing more insights in this topic. 
Moreover, we split up the agglomeration rents in a demand-induced agglomeration 
rent (Krugman) and a supply-induced agglomeration rent (Venables). We take into 
account the impact of taxes and both agglomeration rents simultaneously on firms' 
location decisions. In addition, the interaction between taxes and both types of 
agglomeration rents are included in order to determine whether they mutually 
mitigate each other. 
 
2.2 The Belgian tax system 
In Belgium, the corporate profit tax is a federal tax responsibility. This means that 
the nominal or statutory tax rate (STR) and the taxable income are set at the 
federal level and are therefore equal for companies in every district or region. The 
tax rate itself is progressive according to the taxable income of the firm. Since 
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2003, Belgian corporate tax rates decreased so that for Belgian companies with a 
taxable income up to 322500 euro, the following progressive tax system is applied2: 
 STR before 2003 STR since 2003 
0<=taxable income<25000 28.84% 24.98% 
25000<=taxable income<90000 37.07% 31.98% 
90000<=taxable income<322500 42.23% 35.54% 
 
Companies with a taxable income of more than 322 500 euro are subject to a 
uniform tax rate of 40.17% before 2003 and 33.99% since 2003 (Van Kerckhove 
and Heirewegh (2006)). While the tax rates and rules are independent of a firm's 
location, the effective tax rate (ETR) can differ across firms. The ETR is defined as 
the ratio of firm level `tax liabilities' in a particular year over the `reported profits' 
in that same year. This definition is widely used and known as the micro-backward 
method based on firm-level, archival data (Gupta and Newberry, 1997; Nicodème, 
2001 and 2002; Collins and Shackelford, 2002; Vandenbussche et al., 2006). In 
contrast to the STR, the ETR or real tax burden of a firm differs across districts 
because of several reasons such as tax rulings,3 more tax evasion in districts with a 
less efficient local tax administration (Moesen et al., 1994) or differences in 
deductible local taxes.4 The most important local tax is the surcharge on the 
regional property tax (the base of this regional tax is, however, defined at the 
federal level). The surcharge can be freely set by all 589 municipalities in Belgium. 
Although it is only a surcharge, this source of tax revenue accounts for 40 percent 
of municipal tax revenues (Heyndels and Vuchelen, 1998; Smolders and Goeminne, 
2009) and varies quite substantially across municipalities (see Figure. 3 and 
example in Appendix 2). Since this extra tax can be deducted from the corporate 
taxes (Van Kerchove and Heirewegh, 2003), the average ETRs at the district level 
vary as well. Vandenbussche et al. (2006) provide empirical evidence that the 
effective tax rate of firms located in Flanders is significantly higher than the ETR of 
firms in Wallonia and Brussel when holding all other firm or sector characteristics 
constant. Their study was carried out using large Belgian firms for the period 1993-
2002 (before the Belgian tax reform of 2003). 
  
                                       
2 For example a company that has a taxable base equal to 100000 will pay: 
(25000*24.98%)+((90000-25000)*31.98%)+((100000-90000)*35.54%)=30 586 euro 
3 Firms can ask for a formal tax ruling. This means that they can negotiate with the Belgian 
government about a particular element in their tax liability. 
4 For a list of local taxes see Smolders et al. (2005) and Jonckheere (2008). 
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3. Data and descriptives 
 
3.1 Data 
We study the impact of taxes and agglomeration rents on location decisions within 
Belgium. Belgium has 43 districts - 22 in Flanders (Northern part of the country), 20 
in Wallonia (Southern part of the country) and the last one is Brussel. Figure 1 
illustrates the location of all Belgian districts.5  
For the purpose of our study, we use data from three different sources. First, we 
consult the Belfirst database which comprises annual accounts of 250 000 Belgian 
firms for various years. From this database, we collect the number of new firms at 
the 5 digit sector-level in each Belgian district for the years 1999-2001 (before the 
tax reform) and 2004-2006 (after the tax reform). This set of new firms contains 
both small and large firms. We however select the large firms because these firms 
are assumed to be more footloose and thus deal with location decisions. According 
to Baldwin and Okubo (2008) large firms are most likely to relocate for tax reasons 
compared to small firms. We choose only firms that have profits before tax larger 
than or equal to 322 500 euro in the year following their set up. Hereby, we make 
the assumption that new firms will not generate normal profits in their year of set 
up due to large investments and the introduction time of their product or service, 
but that these new firms will reach normal profits in the following year. This 
selection rules out any effect due to the progressive tax system since all firms in the 
dataset apply the same nominal tax rate as explained above in Subsection 2.2. 
Moreover, firms that went bankrupt in the year after setup are dropped from the 
sample. From Belfirst, we also collect information about the pre-existing stock of 
firms in the 43 Belgian districts. 
                                       
5 See Appendix 1 for a list of the different districts 
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Figure 1: A map of Belgium 
 
The second source of data are the regional accounts of the National Bank of Belgium 
(NBB) providing information on GDP per capita and gross investment 
(infrastructure) for the districts. Finally, we assemble data on prices of building lots 
per square meter (m²) from the federal government (Economics Service; FOD 
Economie). 
3.2 Descriptives 
This section discusses the dependent and explanatory variables with a special focus 
on the taxation and agglomeration variables. For all variables we report on their 
mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum. As far as the key variables 
(count of new firms, tax, agglomeration rents) are concerned, we pay special 
attention to their variation as well. Note that we use two indicators of agglomeration 
rents. The first one is demand-induced and refers to the Krugman (1991) model 
focusing on the market access. The second one is supply-induced and refers to the 
Venables (1996) model with intermediate suppliers. The number of firms per 
squared kilometer is an indicator of the closeness to other firms that may act as 
intermediate suppliers or that may spill over knowledge. 
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Tables 1 and 2 summarize the statistics of the dependent and explanatory variables 
for both time periods. Comparing both tables, we observe that the average number 
of new firms has increased while the average effective tax rate has decreased over 
the years. The decrease in ETR was to be expected given the 2003 tax reform 
mentioned in Subsection 2.2. The number of firms per squared kilometer (Aggl (S)), 
the market potential (Aggl (D)), the price per m² and investments on the other 
hand have increased.  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 1998-2000, averages per year 
 New 
firms 
ETR Aggl (S) Aggl (D) Price m² Infrastructure 
Mean 2.477 0.313 10.291 10841.06 35.664 1146.005 
Std dev 7.037 0.047 29.402 4075.962 29.652 1429.124 
Min 0 0.002 0.384 6144 8.3 135.8 
Max 68 0.485 210.106 27099 209.9 8289.4 
     
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 2003-2005, averages per year 
 New 
firms 
ETR Aggl (S) Aggl (D) Price m² Infrastructure 
Mean 4.651 0.275 14.385 12704.79 66.802 1317.135 
Std dev 10.804 0.025 37.760 4674.035 51.705 1676.781 
Min 0 0.160 0.744 7400 9 147.4 
Max 74 0.344 268.603 30749 350 9324.1 
  
Special attention goes to the variation in the key variables, namely the number of 
new firms, the ETR and the agglomeration indicators. Figures 2 to 4 illustrate for 
each variable the values for all districts in the period 2003-5. The Figures for period 
1998-2000 are not included because they show the same variation in the variables 
considered. The absolute values are lower though as became clear from Tables 1 
and 2. 
As far as the number of new firms is concerned, Figure 2 shows a large variation 
between the different districts. A district like Brussel or Antwerpen - with the 
harbour – attracts most firms while districts in the South of the country like Aat and 
Aarlen only attract a very small number of firms. 
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Figure 2: Average number of new firms by district in Belgium 2003-2005 
 
Figure 3: Average ETR by district in Belgium 2003-2005   
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Looking at Figure 3 we can indeed conclude that the ETR varies quite remarkably 
between the districts going from a high 33% (Virton) to a low 22% (Philippeville). 
Figures 4 and 5 show that both supply- and demand induced agglomeration 
indicators vary substantially between the districts. The most agglomerated regions 
are situated in the North of the country (Flanders) while the least agglomerated 
regions are situated in the South (Wallonia). Note that in contrast to the theory, 
Belgian districts with a high number of firms per squared kilometer or a high market 
potential are not necessarily the districts with higher effective tax rates. This is also 
clear from the correlation matrix in Appendix 4 where both agglomeration rents 
show a negative correlation with the effective tax rates. In other words, Belgium 
does not follow the core-periphery theory like for example Charlot and Paty (2007) 
found for France.  
 
Figure 4: Number of firms per km² by district in Belgium 2003-2005 (Aggl (S)) 
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Figure 5: Market potential by district in Belgium 2003-2005 (Aggl (D))    
 
 
In order to obtain a first glance of the relationship between the number of new firms 
and the ETR, we plot both against each other. Figure 6 illustrates that the effective 
tax rate on average has a negative effect on the location decision of firms. However, 
if we look at the district Halle-Vilvoorde for example, we observe from Figure 2 that 
this district attracts a lot of new firms, although it is amongst the districts with the 
highest ETR according to Figure 3. Therefore, we expect that other factors such as 
agglomeration rents can compensate for a high ETR. 
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Figure 6: New firms versus ETR by district in Belgium, averages for 2003-2005  
 
 
Calculating the correlation coefficient between the ETR and the agglomeration 
indicators gives us a first insight in the possible impact of both types of variables on 
each other. The correlations between the ETR on the one hand and market potential 
and the number of firms per squared kilometer on the other hand are respectively -
0.11 and -0.28 (cfr. correlation matrix Appendix 4). This indicates that in 
determining their taxes, Belgian districts do not appear to take agglomeration 
effects into account. A district with higher agglomeration rents will in other words 
not necessarily opt for a higher ETR. There must be other factors influencing the 
ETR like for instance budgetary reasons. Similar graphs are found if we drop the 
three outliers (Brussel, Antwerpen and Halle-Vilvoorde) and for, for example, four 
important sectors in Belgium, the results are reported in Appendix 3. 
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4. Methodology 
To analyse our research question in a multivariate setting, we estimate the following 
regression (1). 
                        
                                                                     
                                                      
                                    
            (1)  
where the dependent variable is the count of new firms in a certain Belgian district d 
in sector s at year t. Two time periods are considered to evaluate the effects over 
time.6 The independent variables are all lagged one year to rule out any potential 
endogeneity problem. This means that the new firms in the period 1999-2001 are 
assigned to control variables of 1998-2000 and new firms in the period 2004-2006 
are assigned to control variables of 2003-5. The average effective tax rate is, as 
stated before, the amount of taxes paid divided by the profit before tax. We argue 
that the effective tax rate paid by the pre-existing stock of firms in a district may be 
a good indication of the tax rate that new firms might have to pay. Agglomeration is 
measured in two ways. First, we measure the presence of firm-consumer linkages 
by looking at the market potential of a district. Harris (1954) was the first to 
introduce the concept of market potential. He stated that the market potential of a 
region is the weighted sum of the income of all regions – where the weights are a 
negative function of the distance. More in particular, he divided the income of each 
district by the distance to that district. The income of a region close by therefore 
obtains a higher weight than the income of a region further away. In his paper, 
Hanson (2005) weighted the market potential incomes by a negative exponential 
function of distance. The problem with this index is that the weights go to zero very 
quickly. For example, a region that is 100 km further has a weight of only 3,7 E-44. 
We therefore opt for the Harris (1954) definition of market potential. More in 
particular, we calculate market potential as follows: 
                      
      
          
           (2) 
with Yj,t-1 district j's disposable income at time t-1 and dist the distance in 
kilometers between the capital cities of district d and j. This definition includes the 
market potential of the own district d and neighboring districts because especially in 
a small country like Belgium, residents of neighboring districts can also be potential 
customers. Note that the own district’s income has a weight of one while the other 
                                       
6 This allows us to concentrate on regional tax differences and not on tax shocks over time 
which is not the research question of this paper. 
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districts have a weight smaller than 1. Besides all Belgian districts, we also included 
the foreign neighbors of Belgium (France, Germany and the Netherlands) as more 
than 65% of Belgian exports goes to these markets.  
Second, agglomeration in terms of firm-firm linkages is measured as the number of 
firms per squared kilometer in a district. This agglomeration measure is also 
calculated at the three-digit sector level. Both market potential and the presence of 
firms are interacted with the effective tax rate in the analysis. 
Firm entry, tax rates and agglomeration rents can have issues of reversed causality. 
As in Brülhart et al. (2009) we measure firm entry at a very narrow sector level (5-
digits NACE code) and tax rates and agglomeration rents are measured at the 
district level. This should eliminate endogeneity between the variables already. 
Moreover, we computed the tax rates and agglomeration rents for existing firms in 
the district in the year before. Therefore, we are confident that endogeneity is not 
an issue here anymore. 
A first control variable is the average price of building lots per square meter and 
reflects the cost of setting up a new firm. Note that this variable also captures the 
popularity of a district such as its geographic location. It might therefore be higher 
for locationally speaking more interesting districts. A second control variable is the 
gross investment in assets in the district which accounts for the current industrial 
development of a district. Finally, district specific effects are included. These effects 
will take into account the size, the fact that some districts already have built up a 
large infrastructure network, fiscally assisted regions in the years before 20027 and 
other district related unobservable elements that explain firm entry in that area. 
Since our dependent variable consists of counts of new firms in a sector in a district, 
the appropriate approach is a Poisson model. However, there are three particular 
estimation problems to take into account. First, we observe that the variance is 
larger than the mean for all estimations we conduct8 and second there are a lot of 
zero’s for the dependent variable. Third, we want to take into account the district 
fixed effects. It is obvious that besides the explanatory variables we take into 
account, there are other unobserved district specific effects that may play a large 
role in the location decisions. We therefore want to correct for this by introducing 
district of sector fixed effects. In appendix 5 we also report the results of the 
                                       
7 Since 2002, the European Commission has forbidden these fiscal stimuli for particular 
areas. 
8 3-digit 1999-2001: mean=0.04 < variance=0.35 
  3-digit 2004-2006: mean=0.06 < variance=0.52   
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estimation procedure as in Brülhart and Schmidheiny (2009): district or sector 
dummies and standard errors clustered by district-period or sector-period.9 
 
5. Results 
Table 3 summarizes the estimation results of equation (1). Panel (A) of Table 3 uses 
the variable supply-induced agglomeration rents measured at the district level 
(Aggl(A)d,t-1) combined with district fixed effects (columns 1-2) and 5-digit sector 
fixed effects (columns 3-4).  Panel (B) of Table 3 includes the variable supply-
induced agglomeration rents measured at the 5-digit sector and district level 
(Aggl(A)d,s,t-1) also combined with district (columns 1-2) and 5-digit sector fixed 
effects (columns 3-4).   
The results show that the ETR is only significant in the second time period (2004-
2006). This might indicate that the Belgian effective tax rate was too high to play a 
role in location decisions before 2003 (Vandenbussche and Crabbé, 2005), while 
after the corporate tax reform the tax rate became competitive. Comparing the two 
agglomeration variables, we find in Table 3 that the supply-side induced 
agglomeration rents are more often positive and significant than the demand-side 
induced agglomeration rents. In panel (B) of Table 3, the supply agglomeration rent 
variable is not significant anymore or is even negatively significant (column B.2). 
This result might suggest that firms at the 5-digit industry level are not attracted or 
even deterred by the competition of other firms in their sector in that district (panel 
B), while these firms are attracted by the presence of other firms in the district 
(panel A). In other words, agglomeration of firms at the sector-level leads to 
competition, while the presence of firms in general increases chances to find a 
supplier or buyer. 
The interaction effect between agglomeration rents and taxes weakens these 
individual results. A positive agglomeration effect in a district is weakened when 
taxes are high in that district or a deterring effect of high effective tax rate in a 
district is compensated by agglomeration rents.10 
                                       
9 We also tried to include the death rate in the dependent variable (birth rate- death rate) 
and estimate equation (1), but this led to some negative dependent variables (death 
rate>birth rate). Since negative dependent variables are not allowed in a Poisson (or any 
count) model, we had to set these negative numbers equal to zero which decreases the 
variation, but also the number of observations. As a consequence, we do not find these 
results reliable and do not report them here. 
10 We tried these estimations with the dependent variable at the 3 digit sector-level as a 
robustness check. The main findings remain also here: tax rates are negative and significant 
only in the second period and interactions between taxes and agglomeration rents are 
significant. 
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As far as the control variables are concerned, we observe a positive impact of 
investments in the previous period. Furthermore, the price per square meter for 
building lots is positive and significant indicating that (ceteris paribus) firms invest 
in districts where prices are high. At first sight, this seems contradictory, but it is 
possible that prices are correlated with the district-specific effects or implicitly also 
measure a district’s popularity.11  
 
                                       
11 Brülhart et al. (2009) also find this odd positive effect of housing prices in Switzerland on 
firm entry. 
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Table 3: Estimation results for firm-agglomeration (Aggl(S)) at the district level and sector level for both time 
periods; Poisson district and sector fixed effects for 5-digit sectors 
 (A) Aggl(S) at district level (B) Aggl (S) at sector level 
 district fixed effects sector fixed effects district fixed effects sector fixed effects 
 (1) 
1999-
2001 
(2) 
2004-
2006 
(3) 
1999-
2001 
(4) 
2004-
2006 
(1) 
1999-
2001 
(2) 
2004-2006 
(3) 
1999-2001 
(4) 
2004-2006 
Etrt-1 32.06 
(51.13) 
-42.15** 
(19.58) 
17.53 
(15.79) 
-4.75 
(10.7) 
63.92 
(48.61) 
-39.82** 
(18.04) 
14.74 
(10.39) 
-20.51*** 
(6.55) 
Aggl(D)t-1 0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.0001 
(0.0004) 
0.001 
(0.0004) 
0.0003 
(0.0002) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.0002 
(0.0004) 
0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
Aggl(S)t-1 1.38* 
(0.80) 
0.01 
(0.13) 
0.37*** 
(0.1) 
0.13*** 
(0.02) 
22.49 
(18.7) 
-5.55*** 
(2.31) 
3.75 
(18.78) 
-0.53 
(2.6) 
(etr*Aggl(D))t-1 -0.002 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.0003 
(0.001) 
-0.01 
(0.004) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.001* 
(0.001) 
0.001* 
(0.0004) 
 
(etr*Aggl(S))t-1 -4.97* 
(2.64) 
0.69 
(1.03) 
-1.35*** 
(0.34) 
-0.55*** 
(0.1) 
-80.37 
(65) 
21.8*** 
(9.04) 
-13 
(64.84) 
1.38 
(10.08) 
Pricet-1 0.08* 
(0.05) 
0.01*** 
(0.004) 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.01*** 
(0.001) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.01*** 
(0.002) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Infrt-1 0.004 
(0.003) 
0.001*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
-0.0001 
(0.0001) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.001*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0002 
(0.0002) 
0.0001 
(0.0001) 
Observations 12352 16641 3333 7181 12352 16641 3333 7181 
Loglikelihood -782 -2277 -462 -1200 -784 -2281 -476 -1244 
Note: standard errors are reported between brackets. Stars indicate the level of significance, *** is significant at the 
1% level ** is significant at the 5% level and * is significant at the 10% level. 
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6. Conclusion 
This paper tackled the location determinants of new firms setting up activity in 43 
different Belgian districts in the period 1999-2001 and 2004-2006. Literature has 
shown that taxes and agglomeration rents play a large role in a firm’s location 
decision. Higher effective tax rates tend to deter firms while agglomeration rents 
are a centripetal force. 
We analysed the impact of both taxes and agglomeration rents separately as well as 
their interaction. The effective tax rate shows a strong negative relation with firm 
entry after the tax reform (2004-2006), while it is not significant in the period 
1999-2001. This might indicate that regional competition for firms became stronger 
after the tax reform in 2003. The results also show that the presence of firms or a 
high market potential can soften this negative effect of high taxes on firm entry. 
As far as the agglomeration rents are concerned, we took both supply- and 
demand-induced indicators into account. Both the market access effect and the 
supply-side induced variable turn out to be important. The market access effect is 
only significant in the first time period. Supply-side induced agglomeration rents 
attract firms at the regional level. We can therefore conclude that agglomeration 
rents have a positive impact on location decisions of firms when they are measured 
at the regional level. The presence of firms in the same sector in a district deters 
firms to locate in that district because of a potential competition effect. In other 
words, agglomeration of firms at the sector-level leads to competition, while the 
presence of firms in general increases chances to find a supplier or buyer. 
Finally, looking at the interaction between both location determinants, we note that 
a better market access can mitigate the negative impact of a high ETR on the 
location decisions of firms. As far as the supply-side induced agglomeration rents 
are concerned, we conclude that a higher effective tax rate weakens the impact of 
these positive agglomeration rents.  
Our results provide useful insights in location determinants of firms which is of great 
importance for governments trying to attract firms. Moreover, this study shows that 
omitting the interaction between taxes and agglomeration rents can lead to 
incomplete conclusions and is therefore important for further research in this field. 
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Appendix 1: Belgian regions and districts 
Belgium has an area of 30 528 squared kilometers and a population of 10.4 million. 
It exists of 589 municipalities which have representative democracies taking care of 
their own expenditures and revenues. Municipalities levy on average 20 different 
taxes that account for more than 40 percent of local revenues where the surcharges 
on the federal income and property tax are the most important ones (Heyndels and 
Vuchelen (1998)). These municipalities are grouped into 43 districts for 
administrative and election purposes. Again these districts are grouped into ten 
provinces with their own provincial governor and the provinces themselves are 
divided into three regions with their own regional parliament: Flanders, Brussel and 
Wallonia. The analysis in this article focuses on the 42 districts in Flanders and 
Wallonia as illustrated in the following table as well as the district of Brussel. 
Region District 
Flanders Aalst 
Antwerpenen 
Brugge 
Dendermonde 
Diksmuide 
Eeklo 
Gent 
Halle-Vilvoorde 
Hasselt 
Ieper 
Kortrijk 
Leuven 
Maaseik 
Mechelen 
Oostende 
Oudenaarde 
Roeselare 
Sint-Niklaas 
Tielt 
Tongeren 
Turnhout 
Veurne 
Wallonia Aarlen/Arlon 
Aat/Ath 
Bastenaken/Bastogne 
Bergen/Mons 
Borgworm/Waremme 
Charleroi/Charleroi 
Dinant/Dinant 
Doornik/Tournai 
Hoei/Huy 
Luik/Liège 
Marche-en-Famenne\Marche-en-Famenne 
Moeskroen\Mouscron 
Namen\Namur 
Neufchateau\Neufchâteau 
Nijvel\Nivelles  
Philippeville\Philippeville 
Thuin\Thuin 
Verviers\Vérviers 
Virton\Virton 
Zinnik\Soignies 
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Appendix 2: Regional surcharges on property tax in Belgium, 2003-2005 
The ETR or real tax burden of a firm differs across districts because of several 
reasons such as more tax evasion in districts with a less efficient local tax 
administration (Moesen et al., 1994), tax rulings or differences in deductible local 
taxes. 
In this appendix we will give an example on how the surcharges on property tax can 
influence the ETR. The general property tax in Flanders is 2.5%, while the property 
tax in Wallonia and Brussel is 1.25%. Both the province and the municipality can 
ask a surcharge on this percentage. Our example is for the Flemish and Walloon 
municipalities with the highest and lowest surcharge in 2006. We assume the 
cadastral income of a building (2600 m³) to be for example 7000 euro and calculate 
the difference in taxes paid. Note that the taxes that are paid can be deducted from 
the firm’s taxable profit. 
Flanders: 
Regional property tax: 7000x2.5%= 175 euro 
Lowest surcharge = 1250 in for example Diksmuide  175x 12.50= 2188 euro 
Highest surcharge = 2250 in for example Mol  175x22.5= 3938 euro  
Wallonia: 
Regional property tax: 7000x1.25%= 87.5 euro  
Highest surcharge in for example Huy= 3100  87.5x31=2713 euro  
Lowest surcharge in for example Lasne =1200 87.5x12= 1050 euro  
These amounts can be subtracted from the taxable base for the corporate tax 
calculation and thus lowers the ETR.   
The average variation in surcharges across districts is large according to Figure. A1. 
Note that on average the surcharges in Flanders are lower than in Wallonia. 
Because of the higher property tax in Flanders however this does not automatically 
imply a lower total property tax cost in Flanders. 
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Figure A1: Surcharges on property tax in 2006 in Belgium at district level 
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Appendix 3: Scatterplots for the 4 sectors with the largest number of new firms 
Figure A2: New firms versus ETR by district in Belgium 2003-2005 without Brussel, 
Antwerpen and Halle-Vilvoorde 
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Figure A3: New firms versus ETR by district in Belgium 2003-2005 for the business 
service sector 
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Figure A4 New firms versus ETR by district in Belgium 2003-2005 for the financial 
services sector 
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Figure A5: New firms versus ETR by district in Belgium 2003-2005 for the real 
estate sector 
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Figure A6: New firms versus ETR by district in Belgium 2003-2005 for the chemical 
sector 
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Appendix 4: Correlation matrix 1999-2001 and 2004-2006 
 N° of new 
firms 
Etrt-1 Aggl(D)t-1 Aggl(S)t-1 (etr*Aggl(D))t-1 (etr*Aggl(S))t-1 Pricet-1 Infrt-1 
N° of new firms 1        
Etrt-1 -0.015 1       
Aggl(D)t-1 0.081 -0.092 1      
Aggl(S)t-1 0.096 -0.237 0.589 1     
(etr*Aggl(D))t-1 0.078 0.057 0.977 0.503 1    
(etr*Aggl(S))t-1 0.097 -0.142 0.564 0.999  0.507 1   
Pricet-1 0.073 -0.158 0.692 0.753 0.643 0.754 1  
Infrt-1 0.083 -0.142 0.956 0.659 0.926 0.661 0.802 1 
 
 N° of new 
firms 
Etrt-1 Aggl(D)t-1 Aggl(S)t-1 (etr*Aggl(S))t-1 (etr*Aggl(D))t-1 Pricet-1 Infrt-1 
N° of new firms 1        
Etrt-1 -0.046 1       
Aggl(D)t-1 0.137 -0.092 1      
Aggl(S)t-1 0.160 -0.137 0.589 1     
(etr*Aggl(D))t-1 0.124 0.086 0.981 0.509 1    
(etr*Aggl(S))t-1 0.161 -0.228 0.594 0.999  0.516 1   
Pricet-1 0.130 -0.236 0.701 0.667 0.671 0.644 1  
Infrt-1 0.149 -0.141 0.943 0.666 0.670 0.906 0.793 1 
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Appendix 5: Estimation results for firm-agglomeration (Aggl(S)) at the district level and sector level for both time 
periods; district and 5-digit sector dummies included; standard errors clustered by district-period or sector-period. 
 Aggl(S) at district level Aggl (S) at sector level 
 District-period 
clustered 
Sector-period 
clustered 
District-period 
clustered 
Sector-period clustered 
 (1) 
1999-
2001 
(2) 
2004-
2006 
(3) 
1999-
2001 
(4) 
2004-
2006 
(1) 
1999-
2001 
(2) 
2004-2006 
(3) 
1999-
2001 
(4) 
2004-2006 
Etrt-1 32.06 
(37) 
-42.14 
(47.52) 
32.1 
(37.12) 
-42.14*** 
(17.74) 
63.9* 
(38.88) 
-39.81 
(50.6) 
63.91* 
(33.78) 
-39.81*** 
(15.83) 
Aggl(D)t-1 0.002* 
(0.001) 
-0.0001 
(0.001) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.0001 
(0.0004) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.0002 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.0002 
(0.0004) 
Aggl(S)t-1 1.38** 
(0.61) 
0.011 
(0.21) 
1.38*** 
(0.53) 
0.01 
(0.1) 
22.49 
(16.6) 
-5.55*** 
(2.3) 
22.49 
(20.9) 
-5.55 
(3.64) 
(etr*Aggl(D))t-1 -0.002 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
-0.01* 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.01*** 
(0.003) 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
(etr*Aggl(S))t-1 -4.97*** 
(2.02) 
0.69 
(1.69) 
-4.97*** 
(1.8) 
0.69 
(0.83) 
-80.37 
(57.94) 
21.8*** 
(9.09) 
-80.37 
(72.34) 
21.8 
(14.21) 
Pricet-1 0.1* 
(0.1) 
0.01*** 
(0.01) 
0.08 
(0.06) 
0.01*** 
(0.002) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.01** 
(0.003) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.01*** 
(0.002) 
Infrt-1 0.004 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
0.001*** 
(0.0002) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.001* 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
Observations 14222 17446 14222 17446 14222 17446 14222 17446 
Loglikelihood -830 -2344 -830 -2344 -831 -2347 -831 -2347 
Note: standard errors are reported between brackets. Stars indicate the level of significance, *** is significant at the 
1% level ** is significant at the 5% level and * is significant at the 10% level. 
